- Post-traumatic stress disorder
- Statutory interpretation (principles of) (legislative intent)
- Time limits (appeal)
- Notice of accident (by worker)
- Presumptions (first responder)
Subsections 14(10) and (11) of the WSIA specifically address the time limits for filing PTSD claims subject to the presumption of entitlement for first responders. The issue under appeal was whether the Tribunal had the statutory authority to grant a time extension to the worker under section 14 of the WSIA.
The appeal was denied. Decision No. 240/22I granted a time extension to a worker who had failed to meet the legislative transitional provisions for filing a chronic mental stress claim. The Vice-Chair found that the word "must" should be interpreted based on its legal meaning, rather than its ordinary meaning, otherwise "must" would constitute a binding requirement or an imperative. Counsel for TCO submitted that the Panel should consider the reasoning in Decision No. 240/22I. The Panel would then have discretion to extend the time limit for filing a claim for PTSD under that section, and let the case proceed on its merits should the Panel be satisfied that there were extenuating and exceptional circumstances that led to the late filing.The Panel ultimately agreed with the employer and decided that the Tribunal did not have the discretion to allow for a time extension, as the deadline to file a claim under section 14 is mandatory and not directory. It was submitted that legislative intent must be examined, and the Legislature chose not to include any exception for the six-month statutory limitation for filing a claim under section 14. Furthermore, if the Legislature intended to set a mandatory deadline, it was not for tribunals or courts to displace that intent because the tribunal or court considers the consequences to be inconvenient to workers. There would have to be evidence that inconvenience of this effect was unintended by the Legislature. The Panel found that the meaning of the word "must" in section 14(11) was distinguishable from the meaning of the word "must" in section 13.1(5) as set out in Decision No. 240/22I. By not allowing a time extension under section 13.1(5), there may be limited further recourse and a breach could lead to a total nullity. On the other hand, failing to meet the time limit set out in section 14(11) does not result in a total nullity of a worker's claim, but rather, a worker can still seek benefits under section 13. Therefore, the consequences of missing the time limit are not akin to those found in section 13.1(5). As no waiver was included in the provisions of section 14, this was evidence of the Legislature's intention not to provide one. A mandatory interpretation of the word "must" in section 14(11) would achieve the Legislature's intent to limit the filing of claims under this section to a very specific and clear timeline. The Tribunal was not authorized to interpret the word "must" set out in section 14(8) in a manner that was not intended by the Legislature. The Panel agreed that the WSIA creates a workplace insurance plan to accomplish specific objectives in a "financially responsible and accountable manner." Although the WSIA is remedial legislation, there is no "public welfare" imperative to interpret the word "must" differently in its ordinary meaning, as an imperative, from its legal meaning.